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chapter 6A
General Principles of EU Law
Armin Cuyvers
6.1 Legal Dark Matter
In certain ways, general principles can be understood as the dark matter 
of EU law. They unify the law, fill gaps, and lend weight and legitimacy to 
the EU legal order as a whole. Like dark matter, moreover, legal principles can 
be hard to pin down and describe, as often it is their flexibility and fluidity 
that allows them to successfully fulfil the different role they play. Principles are 
also intimately connected to values, often giving a legal voice to considerations 
of morality and social convictions that cannot enter the legal plane directly.1 
Because of their flexibility, general principles may also enable a legal order to 
evolve and adapt, as the general principles themselves may develop along new 
realities and responsibilities, but they may also be used to re-interpret rules 
that block progress.
This Chapter briefly discusses the general principles of EU law. Because the 
EU legal order knows a great many general principles, and because these prin-
ciples play many roles, it is impossible to provide anything close to a complete 
overview here.2 Instead, taking into account the comparative aim of this book 
and the limited space available, this Chapter focusses on one issue that may 
be of particular importance for the EAC: the protection of fundamental rights 
as general principles of EU law. Several other important principles of EU 
law including direct effect, supremacy, subsidiarity and proportionality, are 
discussed in other EU Chapters.3
1   See for example R. Dworkin, ‘Taking Rights Seriously’ (Duckworth, 1977), Chapters 1 and 2 
and (for a different approach) J. Raz, ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’, 81 Yale Law 
Journal 823.
2   For two impressive volumes dedicated to General Principles in EU law, which can provide a 
fuller if still not even complete overview, see T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law 
(2nd edn, OUP, 2006) and X. Groussot, General Principles of Community Law (Europa Law 
Publishing, 2006).
3   See EU Chapters 2, 3, and 4 for the principles of supremacy, direct effect, conferral and sub-
sidiarity. See the EU Chapters on the internal market and free movement for the application 
of the principle of proportionality and consistency.
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Before we engage with the issue of fundamental rights, the next section first 
provides an overview of the nature, legal basis and functions of general prin-
ciples in the EU legal order.
6.2 General Principles in the EU Legal Order
Unlike the EAC, many general principles of EU law are unwritten and judge-
made, even though over time many have been codified in the Treaty.4 Many of 
the more institutional-type of principles can now be found in the beginning 
of the TEU, such as the principle of sincere cooperation, conferral, Member 
State equality and the respect for national constitutional identity, subsidiarity, 
and proportionality.5 Article 6 TEU, which was only introduced with the 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht, now forms the central Treaty provision for the more sub-
stantive general principles relating to fundamental rights:
1. The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 
7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.
(. . .)
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession 
shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties.
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Mem-
ber States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.
Some other provisions, moreover, contain important principles of non-dis-
crimination, including Articles 18, 45 and 157 TFEU. Several important princi-
ples of EU law, however, still have no Treaty basis and remain based on the case 
4   See on the different categories and types of general principles also A. von Bogdandy, ‘Founding 
Principles’ in: A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law 
(2nd edn., Hart, 2010), 11.
5   See Articles 4 and 5 TEU.
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law of the CJEU. These unwritten principles include direct effect, supremacy 
and effectiveness, three of the most distinctive principles of EU law.6
In terms of hierarchical status, the general principles are usually considered 
part of primary law (certainly when they are codified in the Treaty), or other-
wise as a special category of norms that are just below primary law but above 
all other EU law, including secondary legislation and international agreements 
signed by the EU. The hierarchical status of general principles is important 
for the question if principles can even trump the Treaties themselves, and 
thereby the will of the Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaty’. The orthodox 
position still is that this is not possible, although some recent case law may 
suggest that there are some core principles that may in some cases acquire a 
supra-Treaty status.7
One of the reasons that EU law has so many general principles, and that these 
principles play such an important role, is that on many points the Treaties only 
lay down a very limited and open framework. As we shall see moreover, this 
limited framework was primarily focussed on economic integration, and less 
on other legal issues such as fundamental rights. Consequently, it was often up 
to the CJEU to fill in the general framework, provide protection where neces-
sary, and generally breathe life into the bare bones of the Treaties.
This background of general principles can also be seen in the different func-
tions general principles fulfil in the EU legal order. Although alternative catego-
rizations are possible, one can say principles play at least four key roles. Firstly, 
general principles can form an aid to interpretation of primary or secondary 
law.8 Secondly, because of their hierarchical status, general principles can be 
used to review the legality of secondary EU law and international agreements 
6   The CJEU has also accepted multiple other, less far reaching principles in its case law, such 
as the principle of legal certainty, legitimate expectations or national procedural autonomy. 
See for example CJEU Case 112/77 Töpfer, Case C-453/00 Kühne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837or 
Case C-234/04 Kapferer [2006] ECR I-2585. For an example of a principle that was rejected, 
however, see Case C-189/01 Jippes ECLI:EU:C:2001:420 on animal welfare. See on direct effect 
and supremacy also EU Chapter 4.
7   See especially Case C-402/05 P Kadi [2008] ECRI-6351, to which we will return below. See for 
the claim that these principle can trump primary law for example A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU 
Constitutional Law (Hart, 2010), pp. 38–39. For further discussion see. Idriz-Tescan, Legal con-
straints on EU Member States as primary law makers: a case study of the proposed permanent 
safeguard clause on free movement of persons in the EU negotiating framework for Turkey’s 
accession (Diss. Leiden 2015, Meijersreeks; MI-247) and A. Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of 
the General Court: the ECJ’s predicament and the consequences for Member States’. 7 (2011) 
European Constitutional Law Review,. 481.
8   See for a far reaching and contested example Case C-402/07 Sturgeon ECLI:EU:C:2009:716.
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signed by the EU.9 Third, general principles form an independent basis for 
Member State liability.10 Fourth, general principles can be used as ‘gap fillers’. 
Where there is no relevant EU law, or the relevant rules simply do not provide 
an answer, general principles may be used to fill the gap in EU law in a way that 
is consistent with the overall body of EU law and the general principles.11
As indicated, the remainder of this Chapter focusses on two further topics 
that may be of particular interest to the EAC, starting with the pervasive, if not 
always visible, principle of effectiveness.
6.3 Fundamental Rights and General Principles in the EU
Like the EACJ, the CJEU does not have a separate fundamental rights jurisdic-
tion. In other words, individuals cannot go to the CJEU, or even rely on EU 
law, just because one of their fundamental rights may have been violated. 
Individuals and companies can only rely on any rights granted by EU law when 
they are under the scope of EU law, for example because they have moved to 
another Member State, or because they fall under a piece of EU legislation.
Even though EU law today contains multiple fundamental rights, includ-
ing a complete EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, these rights themselves, 
therefore, do not bring an individual within the scope of EU law or create juris-
diction for the CJEU, as will be explained in more detail below. Nevertheless, 
the EU has developed an effective protection of fundamental rights within the 
scope or EU law, largely through the creation and application of general prin-
ciples. This is quite an achievement if one considers that, in the beginning of 
European integration, the Treaties did not refer to fundamental rights at all, 
and the CJEU even explicitly refused to apply fundamental rights.
This section therefore outlines how the CJEU used general principles to go 
from a situation in which EU law offered no protection of fundamental rights 
to a situation where the EU legal order identifies itself as a bastion of funda-
mental rights protection.
9   Joined Cases C-293 and 594/12 Data Retention Directive ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
10   Case C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357 and Case C-46 and 48/93 Brasserie du 
Pêcheur [1996] ECR I-1029.
11   See for example Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365 or Case 294/83 Les Verts ECR 
1986 p. 1339.
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6.3.1 Genesis of Fundamental Rights in the EU
The evolution of fundamental rights in the EU starts with their firm denial by 
the CJEU in Stork.12 A German company wanted to rely on several fundamental 
rights contained in the German constitution against a secondary act of EU law. 
In its reply, the CJEU emphasized the economic nature of the Community:
under Article 8 of the Treaty the High Authority is only required to apply 
Community law. It is not competent to apply the national law of the 
Member States. Similarly, under Article 31 the Court is only required to 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty . . . the law 
is observed. It is not normally required to rule on provisions of national 
law. Consequently, the High Authority is not empowered to examine a 
ground of complaint which maintains that, when it adopted its deci-
sion, it infringed principles of German constitutional law (in particular 
Articles 2 and 12 of the Basic Law).
The denial to protect fundamental rights, however, led to increasing concern 
at the national level. Especially some national constitutional courts were 
alarmed by a Community that claimed increasing authority, including suprem-
acy over national law, but did not offer fundamental rights protection. This 
concern was one of the reasons behind the landmark judgment in Solange I 
by the German Constitutional Court (GCC). The GCC held that as long as fun-
damental rights were not adequately protected in the Community legal order, 
it reserved the right to disapply Community law in Germany.13
Faced with the understandable claim that an increasingly powerful EU 
should protect fundamental rights, the CJEU changed course. In Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft and Nold the CJEU suddenly ‘discovered’ that EU law actu-
ally did contain fundamental rights in the form of general principles.14 in 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, for example, the CJEU held that:
However, an examination should be made as to whether or not any anal-
ogous guarantee inherent in Community law has been disregarded. In 
fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general 
principles of law protected by the court of justice.
12   Case 1/58 Stork ECR 1959 p. 17.
13   BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) Solange I. See also EU Chapter 4 on the importance of this case law 
for the debate on supremacy of EU law as such.
14   Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125 and Case C-4/73 Nold 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:51.
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(. . .)
The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional tra-
ditions common to the Member States, must be ensured within the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community. It must 
therefore be ascertained, in the light of the doubts expressed by the 
Verwaltungsgericht, whether the system of deposits has infringed rights 
of a fundamental nature, respect for which must be ensured in the 
Community.15
Similarly, in Nold the CJEU found:
As the court has already stated, fundamental rights form an integral part 
of the general principles of law, the observance of which it ensures. In 
safeguarding these rights, the court is bound to draw inspiration from 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot 
therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamen-
tal rights recognized and protected by the constitutions of those states. 
Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on 
which the member states have collaborated or of which they are signa-
tories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the frame-
work of Community law.16
The CJEU, therefore, still refused to directly apply national fundamental or 
constitutional rights, also because doing so might threaten the autonomy and 
supremacy of EU law. At the same time, it used the open category of unwrit-
ten principles of EU law to create an ‘analogous’ protection at the EU level. 
The message to the national courts therefore was, do not worry, you do not 
need to apply your national constitutional rights, as EU law provides similar 
protection. In Nold, moreover, the CJEU further clarified that it would also take 
international treaties for the protection of human rights into account when 
determining the fundamental rights protection offered by the general prin-
ciples of EU law.
6.3.2 Consolidation of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order
Once the principled decision had been taken that the EU legal order protected 
fundamental rights, the CJEU could further develop and consolidate this pro-
tection. This consolidation was also supported by national supreme courts 
15   Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, par. 4 a.o.
16   Case C-4/73 Nold ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, par. 13.
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responding positively to the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and Nold line 
of case law. The German Constitutional Court, for example, showed its good 
will by retreating from its Solange I position to a more deferential approach in 
Solange II.17 As long as fundamental rights would be adequately protected by 
the CJEU, the GCC would not exercise its right to disapply Community law in 
Germany, although it retained the authority to do so where manifest breaches 
of fundamental rights would occur.
An important step in the consolidation of fundamental rights as general 
principles came in Baustahlgewebe.18 In this judgment the CJEU loyally applied 
the ECHR and the case law of the European Court of Fundamental Rights in 
Strasbourg (ECtHR), even though the EU was not, and is not, a party to the 
ECHR. This confirmed the trend of the CJEU de facto respecting the ECHR as 
applied by the Strasbourg court. In addition, Baustahlgewebe was the first case 
where the CJEU actually found a violation of a fundamental right by an EU 
institution. The following paragraphs of the judgment show the transforma-
tion of Article 6 ECHR into a general principle of EU law, which could then be 
applied by the CJEU:
It should be noted that Article 6(1) of the EHRC provides that in the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law.
The general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to 
fair legal process, which is inspired by those fundamental rights(. . .), 
and in particular the right to legal process within a reasonable period, is 
applicable in the context of proceedings brought against a Commission 
decision (. . .).19
Even though the ECHR or national constitutional rights did not apply directly 
into the EU legal order, therefore, general principles could be used to ‘import’ 
them and transform them into principles that could be applied in the EU legal 
order.
The recognition of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, and the special 
significance of the ECHR in this regard, was further consolidated by the 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht, which introduced the provision that has now become 
17   BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986) Solange II.
18   Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe ECLI:EU:C:1998:608.
19   Case C-185/95 P Baustahlgewebe ECLI:EU:C:1998:608, paras. 20–21.
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Article 6(3) TEU. As a result of this provision, fundamental rights as general 
principles, as well as the relevance of the ECHR, received a direct foundation 
in the Treaty, further cementing their standing and authority.20
6.3.3 The Ascension of Fundamental Rights: The Charter and Kadi
Despite the de facto application of the ECHR through general principles and 
their recognition in the Treaty, worries remained that the protection of funda-
mental rights within the EU might not go far enough, also because the ECHR 
only provides a minimum level of protection. For this reason, an EU Charter of 
fundamental rights was drafted, containing both the traditional fundamental 
rights and some more modern and social rights and ‘principles’.
The Charter was first only ‘solemnly proclaimed’ on 7 December 2007 
at the Nice European Council. Consequently, it did not have formal legal 
binding effect. Rather, it could be used as a tool for the EU to create or inter-
pret the EU general principles that were legally binding. Subsequently, 
however, the Charter eventually became legally binding after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Somewhat embarrassingly, 
it was not considered politically opportune to include the Charter into the 
Treaties directly, this after the debacle of the Constitutional Treaty.21 Instead, 
Article 6(1) TEU only refers to the Charter, and declares that it has the same 
legal value as the Treaty. Consequently, the Charter is now part of EU Primary 
law, and one of the central sources governing fundamental rights in the EU. 
This also means that since Lisbon, fundamental rights are both protected 
under the Charter and under the General principles of EU law, which continue 
to apply.22
20   At the same time, however, it was the same CJEU that blocked the accession of the EU to 
the ECHR. It was argued that the importation of ECHR rights by the CJEU carried the risk 
that the CJEU might, knowingly or unknowingly, get it wrong at some point, and that there-
fore the EU itself should also accede to the ECHR. The CJEU, however, argued that there 
was no sufficient legal basis for accession in Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:140. After this legal basis was created with the Treaty of Lisbon, however, 
the CJEU again blocked accession, inter alia because it might undermine the autonomy of 
EU law. See Opinion 2/13 on the draft agreement providing for the accession of the European 
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.
21   See EU Chapter 1.
22   See however, section 3.4. below on the scope of the Charter, which is identical to those 
of the general principles and does not create a general human rights jurisdiction for the 
CJEU.
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In addition to the introduction of the Charter, however, recent years saw 
another increase in the importance and standing of fundamental rights and 
general principles in the EU legal order. The key example of this development 
is the Kadi saga. The Kadi cases concerned the imposition of sanctions on indi-
viduals suspected of supporting terrorism. On 17 October 2001 Kadi, a Saudi 
national, was placed on a UN sanctions list because he was suspected of sup-
porting Al Qaeda. This UN sanction was based on resolutions of the Security 
Council under Title VII of the UN charter, and hence claimed absolute primacy 
over all other international law.23 The EU automatically took over all UN sanc-
tions, so on 19 October 2001 Kadi was added to the EU sanctions list. As of that 
moment, all his European assets were frozen. Kadi challenged his EU sanction 
before the CJEU, arguing inter alia that his fundamental rights to a fair trial 
and an effective remedy had been violated. Consequently, the Kadi case lead 
to a direct conflict between EU fundamental rights and a resolution of the UN 
Security Council under Chapter VII.
The General Court essentially found that, under Article 103 UN Charter, the 
UN resolution trumped EU law, unless norms of jus cogens had been violated.24 
The CJEU, however, took the opposite approach. It stressed the foundational 
importance of fundamental rights for the EU legal order, holding inter alia:
Art. 307 EC may in no circumstances permit any challenges to the prin-
ciples that form part of the very foundations of the Community legal order 
(. . .).25
Kadi does not yet form a sufficient basis for the conclusion that some general 
principles may now trump EU primary law. At the same time, it is a striking 
example of just how far fundamental rights and general principles have come 
in the EU legal order since the initial denial of the CJEU in Stork to apply funda-
mental rights at all. At the same time, the impressive rise of fundamental rights 
23   See amongst others Resolution 1904 (2009) and the earlier resolutions mentioned therein, 
as well as Article 103 of the UN Charter.
24   T-315/01 Kadi I [2005] ECR II-3649.
25   ECJ, Case C-402/05 P Kadi [2008] ECRI-6351, par. 304. See for multiple other confirma-
tions of the fundamental importance and hierarchical standing of fundamental rights 
in the EU legal order also paras. 282–326 ECJ. This position was confirmed in Joined Cases 
C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Kadi II, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. See also A. Cuyvers, 
‘“Give me one good reason”: The unified standard of review for sanctions after Kadi II’, 
51(6) Common Market Law Review (2014), 1759.
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should not be confused with the creation of a general fundamental rights juris-
diction, as EU fundamental rights only apply within the scope of EU law.
6.4 Protection within the Scope of EU Law Alone
By its very nature, EU law only applies in situations that fall under the scope 
of EU law.26 Most importantly, this means that purely internal situation, i.e. 
situations that wholly take place in one Member State without any connec-
tion to EU law, do not fall under EU law.27 In such purely internal situations, 
EU law does not apply, and hence individuals cannot derive any protection 
from it. For example, if an Austrian police man were to torture an Austrian 
citizen in Austria, the case would likely not have any connection to EU law. 
Consequently, the Austrian citizen could not rely on Article 4 of the EU Charter 
or on the General Principle of EU law that, inspired by Article 3 ECHR, prohibits 
torture. Naturally, the Austrian citizen will have the protection of the Austrian 
constitution, as well as the ECHR directly as Austria, as all EU Member States, 
is a party to the ECHR.
When drafting the Charter, the Member States wanted to make it very clear 
that the Charter does not extend the scope of EU law, and most certainly does 
not create a general jurisdiction for fundamental rights violations. As Article 51 
of the Charter is at pain to stress:
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the 
principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they 
are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, 
observe the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits 
of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.
2. The Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law 
beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or 
task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the 
Treaties.’
26   See also EU Chapter 4 par. 2 on the concept of scope.
27   Naturally, all acts by EU institutions or bodies fall under the scope of EU law, and hence 
under the scope of the Charter as well. Cf also Article 51(1) of the EU Charter.
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Despite the fact that Article 51(1) of the Charter only refers to Member States 
when ‘implementing’ Union law, the CJEU has held in Åkerberg Fransson that 
the scope of the Charter is the same as the scope of EU law as such:
Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore 
be complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of 
European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered in that 
way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being 
applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails applicability 
of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.
Where, on the other hand, a legal situation does not come within the 
scope of European Union law, the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule 
on it and any provisions of the Charter relied upon cannot, of themselves, 
form the basis for such jurisdiction.28
Over time, the CJEU has clarified that there are three ways of bringing an action 
by a Member State situation under the scope of EU law, and hence the Charter. 
Firstly, Member State actions fall under the scope of EU law where the Member 
State is implementing EU law, for example by implementing a directive. Where 
an individual, for example, is affected by a national law that directly or indi-
rectly implements a directive, she is under the scope of EU law, and hence can 
also rely on EU fundamental rights.29 Secondly, Member States fall under the 
scope of EU law where they are derogating from any rule of EU law. For exam-
ple, any national law that restricts a free movement right, even if it is justified, 
falls under the scope of EU law.30 Lastly, and most complexly, the actions of a 
Member State may also ‘generically’ fall under EU law. For example, this can 
be the case where the subject matter at stake is covered by an EU directive, even 
if the directive itself does not directly apply.31
28   Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, paras. 20–21.
29   See for the broad concept applied by the CJEU, which does not just cover national acts that 
directly implement a directive, also Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, 
paras. 27–28.
30   See in this context also Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659.
31   See for example Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci ECR I-365, where the dispute was brought 
under the scope of EU law based on the directive which did not apply horizontally. Once 
the dispute had been brought under the scope of EU law in this creative manner, the CJEU 
could apply a general principle of EU law to it. For another creative extension to the scope 
of EU law see Case C-34/09 Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177.
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EU fundamental rights, therefore, have no general application, and the CJEU 
has no general fundamental rights jurisdiction. Despite these limitations, how-
ever, the protection offered by EU fundamental rights was seriously developed 
and improved by first developing substantive EU rights, both as general prin-
ciples and via the Treaties, and secondly, by expanding the scope of EU law as 
such. 
